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Abstract 
 
Japan has been heavily affected by the post-9/11 security environment to the degree that it 
may precipitate significant, if as yet still incremental, changes in the overall trajectory of its 
own security policy. Japan on the global level has shared US concerns about the spread of 
terrorism, and on the regional level these concerns have been reflected in the problems of 
potential links between al-Qaeda and insurgency in the Philippines and Indonesia. Japan has 
feared even more the proliferation of WMD in East Asia and beyond. As will be argued in 
this paper, Japan does not accept the full logic of the ‘war on terrorism’ and ‘axis of evil’, and 
the implied linkages between terrorism and WMD, and especially between Iraq and North 
Korea. Nevertheless, Japan is aware that the US for its part increasingly accepts this logic and 
may act upon it in seeking to constrain North Korea’s nuclear programme, and that this may 
then pose severe dilemmas for Japanese security policy in terms of countering North Korea’s 
acquisition of nuclear weapons through military support for its US ally, or through the use of 
economic engagement. 
 
Japan’s security policy evolution is an important test case to examine the impact of the ‘war 
on terrorism’ on the political economy of security and economic inequality, and related 
policy implications for a range of developed states. This paper seeks to explore the evolution 
of Japan’s security policy and its role as a test case in a series of stages. The paper begins by 
examining Japan’s conceptions of the interconnections between economic and security both 
prior to and post 9/11, and the means by which Japan has used economic power in the past in 
the service of its security policy. It then moves on to explore how these economic tools of 
security policy have fared under and been adapted to the post-Cold War and post-9/11 
security environment. Japan’s policy-making commitment to the use of economic power in 
addressing security problems arising from the ‘war on terrorism’ and in other contexts is next 
examined, as with the case of human security, in parallel with a discussion of Japan’s 
increasing commitment to military means. 
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Introduction: 9/11, state reactions and economic approaches to insecurity 
 
In reaction to the events of 9/11, the US has chosen to define a new security global and 
regional security agenda. The George W. Bush administration’s ‘war on terrorism’ is 
characterised by the (often dubious) inter-linking of the issues of non-state terrorist networks, 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the ‘rogue states’ of the ‘axis 
of evil’. The US has pursued its ‘war on terrorism’ by employing its full panoply of power 
capabilities, but it has clearly prioritised the utilisation of military power. In addition to the 
wars that it has prosecuted in Afghanistan and Iraq, it has engaged in varying direct and 
indirect degrees in ‘counter-insurgency’ operations in the Horn of Africa, the Philippines and 
Indonesia. The Bush administration has also indicated its willingness, if necessary, to 
confront by military force North Korea’s WMD programme.  
 
The US’s use of military force post-9/11 has certainly been complemented by the 
employment of economic power. The US has shown a propensity to distribute humanitarian, 
development and military aid for the reconstruction of ‘failed states’, the regime of which it 
has toppled, and to support the stability of aligned and frontline states in the struggle against 
terrorism. Most noticeable in East Asia has been the resumption of US military and economic 
assistance to the Philippines and Indonesia. Nevertheless, the US’s long term commitment to 
‘state-building’ programmes in Afghanistan and Iraq, and to using its economic power to 
address many of the economic roots of societal and state insecurity in other regions that are 
capable of generating terrorist activity, remains questionable. The US’s Millennium 
Challenge Account announced in March 2002 and the US National Security Strategy of 
September 2002 do acknowledge the linkage between economic inequality and the generation 
of conflict. However, the irony is that at the same time that the US is preoccupied with 
attempts to suppress non-state actors and failing states, the economic policies that it 
advocates in these initiatives, consisting of expanded economic assistance predicated on 
stricter conditionalities relating to economic liberalisation, can only serve to further 
undermine the sovereign strength of states and thereby further promote inequalities, the 
motivations for conflict, and the activities of terrorist networks.  
 
The US’s defining of a new security agenda post-9/11 has clear implications for other 
developed states and US allies and the means with which they choose to address extant 
security problems. European states in responding to the ‘war on terrorism’ have experienced 
 4
a variety of dilemmas. On the one hand, they have been supportive of the US-led and UN-
sanctioned military campaign in Afghanistan, and been deeply engaged in state-building 
project following Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). On the other hand, the majority of 
European states have resisted active cooperation with the US in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
doubting the interconnection between terrorism and Iraq’s alleged WMD programmes and 
the US’s designs for state-building in Iraq. Overall there are clear doubts about the wisdom of 
applying military power and essentially technocratic solutions to security problems such as 
terrorism that are more deep-rooted and require political and economic solutions.  
 
The East Asia region and East Asian states, as indicated earlier, are also an integral part of 
the post-9/11 security agenda, and face similar questions about the relative utility of military 
and economic power for the pursuit of security ends. The purpose of this paper is to 
investigate the impact of the post-9/11 security agenda on the security policy of Japan which 
stands as the region’s major developed power, a key US ally, and historically one of the 
strongest practitioners of the political economy of security. Japan’s case is important to 
consider for three inter-related reasons. 
 
Firstly, Japan has been heavily affected by the post-9/11 security environment to the degree 
that it may precipitate significant, if as yet still incremental, changes in the overall trajectory 
of its own security policy. Japan on the global level has shared US concerns about the spread 
of terrorism, and on the regional level these concerns have been reflected in the problems of 
potential links between al-Qaeda and insurgency in the Philippines and Indonesia. Japan has 
feared even more the proliferation of WMD in East Asia and beyond. As will be argued later 
in this paper, Japan does not accept the full logic of the ‘war on terrorism’ and ‘axis of evil’, 
and the implied linkages between terrorism and WMD, and especially between Iraq and 
North Korea. Nevertheless, Japan is aware that the US for its part increasingly accepts this 
logic and may act upon it in seeking to constrain North Korea’s nuclear programme, and that 
this may then pose severe dilemmas for Japanese security policy in terms of countering North 
Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons through military support for its US ally, or through 
the use of economic engagement.  
 
The second reason for examining Japan’s security policy in relation to the post-9/11 security 
agenda is that the ‘war on terrorism’ is not only exerting pressure for change in its security 
policy, but also that these changes take the form of testing Japan’s relative commitment to 
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military and political economy approaches to security. Japan’s constitutional prohibitions 
have meant that the Japanese state has been highly constrained as a major military power in 
the East Asia region and globally in the post-war era. However, the Japanese state throughout 
the Cold War period, and with growing effect in the post-Cold War period, has faced steady 
pressure domestically and from its US alliance partner for the incremental remilitarisation of 
its security policy. Japan’s reaction to the events of 9/11 was to enact in October 2001 an 
Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML) that has enabled it to despatch from 
November 2001 successive flotillas of its Japan Maritime Self Defence Forces (JMSDF) (a 
euphemism for the Japanese navy) to the Indian Ocean in order to provide logistical support 
for US and the military forces of other states engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 
in Afghanistan (Hughes 2002). This change is again incremental and provides the JMSDF 
with a solely non-combat role. But it does represent the first time that Japan’s military has 
been officially despatched overseas in wartime; is an acceleration of the incremental pace of 
remilitarisation; and is a portent of Japan’s increasing moves to participate in US-led military 
‘coalitions of the willing’. Japan has further indicated its potential preparedness to support its 
US ally militarily by passing in 26 July 2003 a Law Concerning Special Measures on 
Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance (LCSMHRA). This law is designed to enable 
the despatch of the Japan Self Defence Forces (JSDF) to provide logistical support for US 
and coalition forces engaged in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Japan as of November 2001, 
though, is yet to make a formal commitment to actually dispatch up to six hundred SDF 
personnel to Iraq due to fears for their security. 
 
At the same time as Japan’s future military role has once again come into question as a result 
of the ‘war on terrorism’, its utilisation of economic power for security purposes has also 
been the subject of scrutiny. Japan’s constrained potential as a military actor in the post-war 
era has obliged it to consider the use of economic power to deal with security problems of 
both a military and non-military nature. Japan, as elucidated in more detail in sections below, 
has articulated conceptions of comprehensive and human security that stress the 
interrelationship between economic inequality and security; has long favoured state-building 
policies as the key to stability in the East Asia region; and since the early 1990s has rivalled 
the US as the first or second largest national donor of Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) in the world.  
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Japan in the context of the ‘war on terrorism’, therefore, is presented with important 
questions about how it should respond to new global and regional security agendas. On the 
one hand, it is faced with demands to expand its military contribution to security via the 
mechanism of US-inspired coalitions. On the other hand, Japan has been presented with new 
opportunities to use its economic power to support political economy approaches towards 
security. This may involve contributions to US reconstruction efforts in Iraq, but also support 
for the European powers’ emphasis on state-building projects. Japan is presented with the 
need to reconcile military and economic approaches to security. In certain instances these two 
approaches may prove compatible with each other and with US policy. In others, it may force 
Japan to diverge from the US and to seek an economic role in security that approximates 
more with the European approach. Either way, it can be seen that the ‘war on terrorism’, in 
the same way as the case of the developed European states, carries fundamental implications 
for Japan’s relative commitment to military and economic power in the overall make-up of its 
security policy.   
 
In turn, Japan’s case is considered for a third reason relating to the general interrelationship 
between economic inequality and insecurity in East Asia, and the willingness of developed 
states to follow economic based approaches to security in the region. This is because the case 
of Japan, beyond demonstrating the effects of the US’s new global security agenda on 
economic approaches to security of one particular state, also carries implications for other 
states world-wide. For if it can be divined that Japan as one of the most committed of the 
developed states to the use of economic power for security ends, and as one of the largest aid 
donors in the world, has become less convinced of the efficacy of economic approaches to 
security, then this raises the question of how far the other developed states will persist with 
these approaches in East Asia. In other words, if even Japan feels that it cannot make a 
difference to regional security through the use of economic power, this leads to the 
consideration that the future of the new security agenda may indeed be dominated by US 
conceptions of the primacy of military power.  
 
Japan’s security policy is thus an important test case to examine the impact of the post-9/11 
security agenda on economic approaches to security policy. This paper seeks to explore this 
issue in a series of stages. The paper begins by examining Japan’s conceptions of the 
interconnections between economic and security both prior to and post-9/11, and the means 
by which Japan has used economic power in the past in the service of its security policy. It 
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then moves on to explore how these economic tools of security policy have fared under and 
been adapted to the post-Cold War and post-9/11 security environment. Japan’s policy-
making commitment to the use of economic power in addressing security problems arising 
from the ‘war on terrorism’ and in other contexts is next examined, in parallel with a 
discussion of Japan’s increasing commitment to military means.  
 
In terms of overall arguments, this paper seeks to stress that Japan in responding to the ‘war 
on terrorism’ has in some ways actually further sharpened its consciousness of the impact of 
economic inequality on security, and consequently has enhanced its usage of economic power 
as security tool. Japan has retained its strong conceptions of comprehensive security and been 
obliged to make a series of changes to its economic statecraft and ODA policies that have 
meant that in many instances it has more sophisticated instruments to use for conflict 
prevention. However, the paper also argues that although Japan remains committed to 
political economy approaches towards achieving security, it simultaneously is increasingly 
entertaining a larger military role for itself. The overall consequence is that Japan’s military 
role is beginning to outstrip its economic role in international security. Hence, the greater 
likelihood is that Japan over the longer term may emerge as a bigger military actor more 
closely aligned to the US, rather than as an important economic security actor.  
 
 
Japanese conceptions of the political economy of security  
  
Japanese traditions of the political economy of security from the early modern to 
contemporary eras 
Japan’s policy elites since the Meiji period (1868-1912) and emergence of the Japanese state 
into the modern international system have been aware of the inextricable linkages between 
economics and security. Japanese policy-makers were aware that, in order to survive and 
avoid colonisation as a late-starter in an international order dominated by the early-starter 
military and economic imperial powers of the West, it was necessary for Japan to embark on 
an intensive programme of nation- and state-building. For Japan this state-building process 
was encapsulated in the slogan of fukoku kyōhei (rich nation, strong army), which emphasised 
in equal measure the development of a strong domestic economy and technologies and 
complementary military capabilities (Samuels 1991). Japanese policy-makers in the 
remainder of the Meiji period, and in the succeeding Taishō and Shōwa periods prior to the 
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outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, further came to the conclusion that Japan’s programme 
of state-building and national survival required access to natural resources and overseas 
markets, and thus the acquisition of Japan’s own empire in East Asia (Hook et al 2001, p. 
28).  
 
Japan’s catastrophic defeat at the hands of the Allied powers in World War II, and the failure 
of its regionalist imperial experiment in the shape of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere, greatly discredited in the eyes of many Japanese the role of military power as the 
primary, or necessarily sufficient, means to achieve security. Japan’s demilitarisation under 
the US-led Allied Occupation, and the corresponding growth of anti-militaristic and anti-
nuclear norms in Japanese society, further ensured that its future military role would be 
heavily circumscribed. Japanese policy-makers certainly did not ignore altogether the role of 
military power in security affairs. Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru’s decision to seek and sign 
a security treaty with the US in 1951 (revised in 1960), and to accept Japanese light 
rearmament through the eventual formation of the SDF in 1954, reflected a pragmatic 
perception that alignment with and security guarantees from the US were essential to Japan’s 
survival in the midst of intensifying Cold War pressures in East Asia. In turn, by the early 
1980s, as US-Japan security cooperation increased, Japan’s alignment with the US gave way 
to a security relationship that could openly be termed as an alliance. Moreover, Japan, 
encouraged by the US, upgraded its national military capabilities and range of missions in 
support of US power projection functions in the region. 
 
Nevertheless, despite Japan’s willingness to depend in large part on the US for military 
security during the Cold War and since, it is arguable that the most distinct feature of 
Japanese security policy in the post-war period has been the continuing recognition of the 
interrelationship between economics and security. Prime Minister Yoshida’s vision of post-
war Japan’s role in international society, often referred to as the ‘Yoshida Doctrine’, was one, 
which, whilst not eschewing military power altogether, saw Japan as ultimately ensuring its 
national security through economic means. Yoshida and other influential Japanese policy-
makers in the early post-war period were cognisant that it had been domestic economic 
inequalities and instability during the ‘Great Crisis’ of the 1930s, and the subsequent failure 
of the state to provide economic benefits and redistribute economic costs, that had 
precipitated domestic social and political instability, and which had then fuelled militarism 
and Japanese external military adventurism. Hence, even if the Japanese state had not entirely 
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failed in this period, its pre-war history had demonstrated the chain of linkages between 
domestic economic, societal and political insecurity, and the generation of international 
conflicts.  
 
In a similar fashion, Japanese policy makers were aware that economic insecurity, and the 
incapacity of state structures to respond to these challenges, and the concomitant risks of 
conflict, were not limited solely to Japan’s own example. From the Meiji period onwards, 
Japan’s elites looked on in apprehension at China’s failure to emerge into modern statehood 
and to develop commensurate economic and military institutions, its internal disintegration, 
and then its consequent dismemberment by the imperial powers. Japan’s decision, often 
haphazardly arrived at, to intervene in China and to seek its own further imperial 
aggrandisement was seen at the time as a defensive act to prevent the Western domination of 
Japan’s neighbour. Following Japan’s eventual defeat in World War II, policy-making 
opinion remained divided over the justification and wisdom of Japanese actions. Nonetheless, 
Japanese policy-makers were united in accepting that pre-war China’s travails represented an 
example of how failing states could produce conditions for internal conflict, external 
intervention,  and regional destabilisation, with the end result that Japan could become 
dragged into a disastrous conflict.  
 
Japanese policy-makers’ historical experience in East Asia thus reinforced the long-held view 
of the intrinsic linkages between economic inequality, social, political and military security 
dynamics. In many ways, economic insecurity, and the inability of states to provide the 
conditions for economic prosperity and social stability, were seen as the root causes 
motivating conflict on Japan’s part and conflict centred on neighbouring states. Japan’s 
fundamental understanding of the political economy of security running through the pre-war 
and post-war eras, in turn fed through into key security policy measures premised on the 
importance of economics. 
 
Therefore, in addition to alignment with the US and light rearmament, the Yoshida doctrine’s 
other major tenet was that Japan should concentrate on economic restructuring and the 
rebuilding of the state’s economic functions, as only this could fully guarantee Japan’s 
internal security and stabilise its external security behaviour. In conjunction with this, 
Yoshida and successive policy elites emphasised the importance of restoring economic ties 
with East Asia and other regions in order promote the stability of Japan’s international 
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security environment. This task was thought to be especially important in East Asia due to the 
fact that many of the newly independent sovereign states of the region were systemically 
weak. These states needed to be buttressed economically to cope with the internal stresses 
derived from the legacy of colonialism, such as ethnic divides and questions of regime 
legitimacy, and to cope with the harsh external pressures of the onset of the Cold War in the 
region. Japan’s concentration on economic reconstruction and economic ties with the East 
Asia without doubt contained a large element of mercantilism. Nonetheless, this mercantilism 
was benign to some extent; charged as it was with the Japanese belief that improved 
economic ties would certainly boost the Japanese economy back to a position of pre-
eminence in East Asia, but that it would still benefit the other states of the region through 
reducing economic inequalities, enhancing their economic development and state-building 
processes.  
 
Japan’s comprehensive security policy and ODA policies 
Japan’s keen perception of the linkages between economics and security was further 
demonstrated in the Cold War period by its conceptualisation of comprehensive security 
policy and its development of economic security policy tools. The concept of comprehensive 
security was first articulated during the administration of Prime Minister Ōhira Masayoshi 
(1978-80), with the premier’s commissioning of the National Institute for Research 
Advancement (NIRA) to produce a Report on Comprehensive National Security. The 
successor administration of Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkō (1980-1982) then adopted elements 
of the report as national policy, and established a new Comprehensive National Security 
Council in December 1980 (Chapman, Drifte and Gow 1983). The concept was produced set 
against a background of enhanced economic uncertainty and strategic fluidity in the 
international system, and was notable in stressing not only the interrelationship between 
economic insecurity and the generation of military conflict, but also that problems of unequal 
access to economic resources and economic dislocation should be viewed as security threats 
to states and their citizens in their own right.  
 
The comprehensive security report’s emphasis on the political economy of security was 
matched by Japan’s emerging aid policy in this period. Japan had been a modest ODA donor 
in East Asia since the 1950s and 1960s as part of its reparations and normalisation 
programme with former colonies. Japan rapidly increased its ODA disbursements in East 
Asia and globally from the mid-1970s onwards. In part, Japan’s expansion of ODA provision 
 11
was a device to counter hostile sentiment resulting from increased Japanese economic 
penetration of East Asian states, and Japan’s growing image as an ‘economic animal’ and 
purveyor of economic threats. Japan, in major part also, increased its aid provision in order to 
support US Cold War strategy and those states in East Asia and other regions that were seen 
as crucial in playing a ‘frontline’ role (or as described in the official Japanese parlance, aid to 
countries bordering on areas of conflict) in countering the resurgence of Soviet power. Japan 
thus increased its ‘aid to USA aid’ in the Horn of Africa, Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, 
Indonesia, and South Korea (Pharr 1993, p. 251).  
 
Nonetheless, at the same time as Japan accepted the need and utility to provide aid to support 
key US allies, it is also apparent that Japanese ODA policy in this period was motivated by a 
deep and genuine recognition of the links between economics and security, and a wider 
security agenda that went beyond the immediate exigencies of the Cold War. Japanese ODA 
was designed in this period not simply to ensure the security of pro-US regimes, but also had 
a very significant bent towards long term developmentalism and state-building. Japan’s aid to 
‘frontline’ states in Northeast and Southeast Asia was concentrated in efforts to develop the 
industrial infrastructure to foster long-term economic growth and domestic political 
stabilisation. Moreover, Japan’s ODA was not allocated exclusively to overt US allies. Japan 
directed increasing quantities of ODA towards China as a means to support its reform efforts 
and to assist in preserving its internal economic and political stability. For Japan’s policy-
makers the lessons of the pre-war still held constant: there was only one threat greater to 
Japan than a strong China, and that was a weak one, with all its attendant problems of civil 
strife and unpredictable external relations (Hughes 2004 forthcoming).  
 
Japan’s emergence as an ODA ‘great power’ in the latter stages of the Cold War was clearly 
not without problems. It was often directed to serve Japanese private business interests as 
well as those of the recipient state; its strategic and security purpose was often poorly 
articulated and the implementation subject to inter-ministerial rivalries; the emphasis was on 
large industrial infrastructure projects and immediate economic growth rather than human 
development; and ODA was often directed to support authoritarian regimes in the belief that 
these offered the most viable governing structures to support high speed growth, and that they 
would then steadily evolve into more democratic forms as economic development produced 
manageable incremental social and political change (Watanabe 2001). Still, Japan’s provision 
of ODA in this period represented a clear manifestation of the belief that economic growth 
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held the key to state-building strategies, internal social and political stabilisation, and thus 
ultimately the prevention of conflict domestically and internationally.  
 
Japan’s conviction in the interconnection between economics and security is further shown 
by the fact that in the post-Cold War period it has not only maintained but in certain ways 
strengthened its economic approaches to security policy. Japanese government-commissioned 
reports relating to the future of national security policy have continued to argue that Japan 
should adopt a comprehensive approach whereby it employs economic and military power in 
careful combination (Advisory Group of Defense Issues 1994, p. 7; Prime Minister’s 
Commission on Japan’s Goals in the Twenty First Century 2000, p. 45). In addition, the onset 
of globalisation pressures and the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 have indicated 
anew the security threats associated with economic dislocation. Japanese policy-makers have 
witnessed how in the case of Indonesia the financial crisis has plunged individuals into 
poverty and worsened economic inequalities, heightened societal insecurity, questioned the 
legitimacy of the ruling elites, enfeebled the central and local government apparatus of the 
state, undermined state-building agendas, and opened a ‘Pandora’s box’ of ethnic tensions 
and separatism, often leading to violent conflict.  
 
The Japanese government’s response to these security problems engendered by economic 
liberalisation and globalisation has been to continue to provide large scale ODA to the states 
of East Asia. Japan’s principal economic approach towards security in East Asia thus remains 
one of developmentalism in the belief that this will undergird state-building programmes and 
eventual economic and political stability (Hughes 2000, pp.  232, 243, 250-251). However, 
Japan’s ODA policy in the post-Cold War period and in dealing with the fall-out from 
globalisation has not been static and has shown new adaptability. Japan approved an ODA 
Charter in 1992 which outlined for the first time the principles underlying its aid programme, 
and emphasised that Japan in future aid allocations it would take note of issues such as 
recipient states’ record on the development of WMD, arms expenditure, democratisation and 
human rights. Japan then revised the ODA Charter in mid-2003, providing its aid policy with 
an increasingly heavy stress on conflict prevention (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003a) via 
the elimination of economic inequalities. 
 
Japan’s record of strictly following these principles has been open to question, and 
particularly its subordination of political issues to economic interests (Hook and Zhang 
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1998). It is fair to say, though, that the original and revised ODA Charters have given Japan’s 
aid programmes a more explicit political and security-oriented character in the post-Cold War 
period, and this has then slowly fed through into important changes in the sectoral direction 
of ODA provision. The majority of share of Japan’s ODA is still directed towards economic 
infrastructure and production. But this share since the late 1980s has gradually decreased, 
whereas Japanese support for the less physical and material aspects of state-building such as 
education, health, administration and civil society has gradually increased (Hirono 2001, pp. 
13-14; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003b: 101). Japan has also begun to follow other 
developed states in promoting programmes such as Security Sector Reform (SSR), 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), and improved governance. This type 
of approach was emphasised particularly by the Japanese government’s Advisory Group on 
International Cooperation for Peace which was established by Prime Minister Koizumi 
Junichirō to investigate ways to increase Japan’s role in international efforts for the 
consolidation of peace and nation-building (Kokusai Kyōryoku Kondaikai 2002) 
 
Japan’s increasingly targeted ODA policy has been further refined through the articulation of 
the concept of human security. In 1998 the Japanese government established a United 
Nations Trust Fund for Human Security to support UN human security-centred agencies, and 
in January 2001 formed a Commission for Human Security charged with deepening 
understanding of the concept. Japan under the banner of human security has mainly 
emphasised those threats to human life, livelihoods and dignity generated by globalisation 
and economic liberalisation, including poverty and debt relief, environmental degradation, 
illicit drugs, transnational crime, infectious diseases, and the provision of health care. In May 
2003, the Commission for Human Security issued its final report. The report again drew 
attention to the importance of ODA as a means to address the root economic sources of 
human security, conflict prevention and post-conflict recovery; and it stressed the 
interconnection between poverty, economic inequalities, human security and conflict 
generation, and the consequent need to use economic means to address this set of issues 
(Commission on Human Security 2003, pp. 72-90). 
 
Japan’s future ODA programmes and emphasis on human security should once again not be 
seen as unproblematic. Japan’s own economic difficulties mean that its ODA budget has been 
subject to cuts (cut by 10 per cent a year since 2001). Renewed Sino-Japanese tensions have 
enhanced pressures inside Japan to use ODA as means of leverage over China rather than a 
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means to engage and build economic interdependence, and these principles may be applied to 
other contexts. ODA implementation and strategy is still subject to inter-ministerial rivalry, 
and the bulk of the ODA allocation are still focussed on large economic infrastructure 
projects. Human security is also problematic in the sense that Japan needs to iron out certain 
contradictions and inconsistencies. It needs to consider whether support for authoritarian 
regimes in East Asia is always consistent with individual human security, and why it chooses 
to ‘securitise’ (Waever 1995) certain problems such as migration and hunger in certain parts 
of East Asia but refuses to treat similar issues in the same way in the case of North Korea 
(Hughes 2004 forthcoming).  
 
Notwithstanding this, however, Japan’s ODA policy and economic approaches to insecurity 
can be seen to have had important applications in the East Asia region in the post-Cold War 
period. Japanese involvement in the Cambodian peace process was notable because this saw 
the first despatch of the SDF on limited peace-keeping operations. But Japan’s most 
important role was the use of economic assistance for post-conflict reconstruction, and the 
offering of economic inducements to the governing parties to maintain the peace settlement 
following the abortive coup of 1997 (Hook et al 2001, pp. 188-189). Japan has had a similar 
involvement in East Timor: despatching its largest SDF contingent to date for peacekeeping 
and reconstruction duties, as well as providing targeted aid for state-building activities (in 
fact underwriting Timor-Leste state to the point of providing 25 per cent of the total aid 
budget for the new state).  
 
From the above discussion of the evolution of Japan’s security policy from the early modern 
through to the contemporary period it can be seen that it has been consistently characterised 
by an emphasis on the economic roots of insecurity, and, concomitantly, the importance of 
economic policy tools to tackling extant security problems. Japan has professed, and to a 
large degree practised, a comprehensive view of security that seeks to use economic and 
military power in balanced combination, often with economic power as the foremost policy 
instrument. Japan in terms of policy tools has sought to use ODA and the building of 
economic interdependence as a means to promote developmentalism, economic growth and 
state-building agendas. In the post-Cold War era it has further complemented its conception 
of comprehensive security with one of human security that seeks to address the economic 
causes of individual human security.  
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In many ways, then, Japan can been seen to stand apart from other developed states in the 
consistent level of its commitment to, and prioritisation of, political economy approaches to 
security. Japan would also seem to be well placed to respond to  a range of contemporary 
security problems that are generated by economic globalisation and resultant inequalities, or 
which require the application of economic power. It could be argued that Japan is also in a 
uniquely strong position to contribute to international security in the ‘war on terror’ through 
support for state-building agendas and human security. The questions thus explored in the 
next section is how Japan’s comprehensive security policy has fared under the conditions of 
the ‘war on terror’; how far it has been seen to remain relevant and to make a distinct 
contribution in conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction; and how far the balance 
between economic and military power has been skewed in responding to the problems of 
transnational terrorism and the US-crafted security strategy. 
 
Japanese comprehensive security policy and the ‘war on terror’ 
 
Japan and the Afghan campaign 
Japan’s security policy following the events of 9/11 and initiation of the US ‘war on terror’ 
has been presented with some difficult choices, and subsequently divisions have emerged 
amongst it policy-makers regarding the optimum response and the appropriate mix of military 
and economic policy tools. Japanese policy-makers, on the one hand, have expressed their 
abhorrence at the terrorist attacks on the US; recognised fully the threat of transnational terror 
networks to international security; and pledged backing for the efforts of the US and 
international community, including military action, to eradicate terrorism. 
 
On the other hand, though, despite the shared recognition of the potential threat of terrorism 
and acceptance of the need for a measure of military response, Japan’s policy-makers have 
maintained serious reservations about the general wisdom and effectiveness of the US policy 
approach. In particular, Japanese policy-makers and public opinion have debated whether the 
application of overwhelming military power should be the primary means to combat 
terrorism, and how effective this approach will really prove over the longer term if it is not 
backed up with the application of appropriate and sufficient amounts of economic power 
(Terashima 2002). Japan’s policy elites above all have argued that the root causes of 
domestic and transnational terrorist phenomena lie in the economic inequalities, societal 
alienation, human insecurity, and the failure of state apparatuses to provide for the security of 
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their citizens. Japan has contended that the logical response to terrorism should then be the 
application of economic power. This should address not only the humanitarian fall-out from 
military action, but also address the very roots causes of terrorism by engaging in economic 
stabilisation and state-building programmes. Hence, Japan’s policy-makers in the immediate 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks often found themselves occupying a position closer to their 
counterparts in Europe than in the US.  
 
Japan’s overall preference for political economy understandings and approaches towards 
terrorism was demonstrated by its response to the US-led war in Afghanistan. Japanese 
policy-makers soon after 9/11 sensed that it would undoubtedly be necessary to provide 
support for US military action against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and were motivated in this 
belief by a variety of factors. Japan’s political and bureaucratic leadership were certainly 
wary that there should be no repeat of the ‘Gulf War’ syndrome of 1990-1991, when Japan 
had been subject to heavy US and international criticism for its alleged reliance on 
‘chequebook’ diplomacy and provision of economic assistance to the coalition war effort, 
rather than making a ‘human’ and military contribution. In addition, sections of Japanese 
policy elites were conscious that the response to 9/11 would form a major test of the political 
credibility of the US-Japan alliance relationship, and an opportunity for Japan to further 
expand incrementally the potential range of its support for US global and regional military 
strategy. Just as importantly, though, and as indicated above, much of Japanese policy-
making opinion was also convinced that an initial military response would be necessary to 
disrupt the al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan, and even if this also involved the simultaneous 
destruction of the Taliban regime.  
 
Japan was therefore prepared to offer a degree of heavily circumscribed military assistance to 
the US-led coalition in the Afghan campaign. Japan’s ATSML enabled the despatch of the 
SDF to the Indian Ocean area in order to provide non-combat logistical support to US and the 
forces of other states engaged solely in combating terrorism. The ATSML was drafted in 
such a way that Japan support for the campaign was made possible only by the existence of 
relevant UN resolutions and was consequently limited to operations in Afghanistan. Japan 
has no obligation under the ATSML to provide support in any other theatre of operation, and 
the law itself is limited to a two year, although extendable, time frame. Japan did then take 
important new steps in its military policy in the despatch of the SDF overseas for the first 
time during ongoing combat operations, and, as argued elsewhere, the ATSML has set 
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important potential precedents for US-Japan alliance cooperation in other contexts (Hughes 
2002). But Japan’s support for the Afghan campaign still represented only one more 
incremental step in the expansion of it military role in international security, and 
demonstrated its continued inherent caution in becoming embroiled in military conflicts.  
 
Japan’s principal contribution to attempts to eliminate terrorism in Afghanistan came instead 
in the form of the utilisation of economic power. Japan in the run up to the campaign in 
certain ways could be seen to reprise its Cold War role of providing ODA to ‘frontline’ states 
in order to buttress US military strategy. Japan’s government provided a total of US$300 
million of bilateral assistance to Pakistan from September 2001 onwards for education, health 
and poverty reduction. From October 2001 onwards it also discontinued its limited sanctions 
on India and Pakistan, imposed since May 1998 in response to their nuclear testing activities 
Japan further pledged a total of US$18 million in immediate assistance to Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan. Japan’s SDF delivered a range of humanitarian assistance to Pakistan for Afghan 
refugees, and the government pledge US$102 million via the UN and other agencies of 
refugee assistance.  
 
However, Japan’s approach in using economic power to contribute to the effort against al-
Qaeda consisted of more than just immediate humanitarian aid and support for states friendly 
to US war aims on the periphery of Afghanistan. Japan following the fall of the Taliban 
demonstrated that it was deeply committed to state-building efforts in Afghanistan as forming 
the most likely eventual solution to terrorist activity in this region. Japan hosted in Tokyo the 
International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan on 21-22 January 
2002. Japan at the conference pledged up to US$500 million for rebuilding the government 
and physical infrastructure of the country, and the conference itself raised a total of US$4.5 
billion. The Japanese government then dispatched a fact-finding mission to Afghanistan in 
March 2002 which concluded that Japan should concentrate its ODA towards Afghanistan 
not simply in short term humanitarian assistance but also longer term assistance in areas such 
as the rebuilding of media infrastructure, capacity building in administration; human resource 
development in education and health, and training for women for reintegration into public 
life. Japan concluded also that significant proportions of its ODA should be allocated to 
‘grassroots’ projects managed by NGOs, including drilling water wells, and heath and 
education training. Japan from July 2002 onwards announced its intention to support UN 
programmes for the DDR of former combatants; the training of Afghan civilian police; drug 
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control; and the resettlement of refugees. It then sponsored a further conference in Tokyo in 
February 2003 on the ‘Consolidation of Peace in Afghanistan’ which reiterated these aims. 
Finally, Japan has seen the Afghan situation as means to further expand its programme of 
human security: providing assistance under its UN Trust Fund for Human Security for 
programmes relating health, education and the removal of anti-personnel landmines. 
 
Japan can be seen to have played a highly active role in attempting to combat the 
reemergence of terrorism in Afghanistan by non-military means. Its approach has focussed on 
the provision of aid for state-building and human security agendas. It has devoted funds not 
just to the rebuilding of physical infrastructure, but also to enable the new Afghan 
administration to attempt to affect economic and social restructuring. Japan has also shown 
that its commitment to Afghanistan’s future is long term, all indicating that it is very much 
concerned with the intricacies of state-building. In this sense, Japan has certainly been able to 
stand upon its conceptions of comprehensive security and to make a distinct contribution to 
international security. It can also be seen to have stood closer to the Europeans than the US. 
For while Japan’s economic assistance has often complemented that of the US, and the US 
has shown a significant commitment to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, the Bush 
administration’s interest to Afghanistan as a whole, let alone state-building, has come to be 
questioned from an early date.  
 
Japan’s political economy approach to addressing security problems, and especially the issue 
of terrorism, has extended also to its own region in East Asia. The response of the US to the 
problem of Abu Sayaf Group (ASG) terrorism and insurgency in the Mindanao province of 
the Philippines has been to employ a mix of military and economic means reminiscent of the 
Cold War. Since late 2001, the US has despatched up to 1,200 special forces personnel to 
assist in the training of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in anti-terrorism 
techniques. It has also provided US$100 million in aid, but a significant proportion of this is 
made up of military assistance in the form of weaponry transfers. Japan’s approach has 
contrasted strongly with that of the US. Japan’s constitutional prohibitions clearly preclude it 
from any type of military option in the Philippines. But it is also the case that Japan again has 
shown a distinctly different understanding of the root causes and optimum means to assist the 
government of the Philippines to deal with terrorism.  
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Japan has viewed intra-state separatist conflict and terrorism in the Mindanao area of the 
Philippines as in part the outcome of the relative failure to date of that state’s developmental 
agenda, and the resultant severe economic disparities imposed on Mindanao. Consequently, 
the Japanese government in December 2002 unveiled a ‘Support Package for Peace and 
Stability in Mindanao’. It argued that strife in this Mindanao had, ‘aggravated the issue of 
poverty the area, creating a hotbed of terrorism’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2002: 
2). Moreover, it stressed that the conflict undermines opportunities for FDI in the region and 
the development of the Philippines as a whole, thus reinforcing the cycle of poverty and 
conflict. Japan’s ODA package for Mindanao has aimed to break this cycle by improving the 
training of human resources in the region, and by providing basic human needs such as 
medical care, rural development and infrastructure. In this way, Japan’s declared aim has 
been to support the government of the Philippines efforts to fight simultaneously poverty and 
terrorism. 
 
Japanese policy in Indonesia has also taken a slightly different tack from that of the US. As 
noted earlier, Japanese policy-makers watched with apprehension the onset of the East Asian 
financial crisis from 1997-1998 and the strictures imposed on assistance to Indonesia 
imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the US, aware that these would undo 
many of the state-building efforts of the Indonesian regime and subsequently have major 
implications for political stability and internal security. Japanese predictions were borne out 
with the political turmoil at the centre of Indonesia which produced the collapse of successive 
governments, challenges to the territorial integrity of the Indonesia archipelago, and 
enhanced conditions for the operation of terrorism. Japan’s preferred policy has been to 
maintain the territorial integrity of Indonesia, and it only switched to the support of Timorese 
independence when it became clear that international intervention made this a fait accompli. 
Japan also attempted to broker in 2002 what has ultimately turned out to be an unsuccessful 
cease fire agreement in Aceh as another means to preserve Indonesia as one unit. Japan’s 
support for the territorial integrity of Indonesia has involved the continued disbursement by 
Japan of large sums of bilateral and multilateral ODA 
 
Japan’s current political and economic support for Indonesia is clearly problematic in terms 
of bolstering what has become a democratic regime but which is also engaged in the 
repression of internal dissent in certain of its provinces. Japanese policy-makers, however, 
see their support for the Indonesian state as the policy option least likely to result in 
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insecurity for the bulk of the population, and also as a means of addressing the problem of 
terrorism. Japan again sees the key to tackling terrorism in Indonesia as the strengthening of 
state capacities, the improvement of economic conditions, and dealing with economic 
inequalities, poverty and injustice, factors that there were termed in the 2003 Japan-Indonesia 
Joint Announcement on Fighting International Terrorism as the ‘root causes of terrorism’ 
(MOFA 2003c). Japan’s approach towards the ‘war on terror’ in Indonesia has, as in the case 
of the Philippines, had to contrast with that of the US due its inability to project military 
power in the region or offer any form of military assistance. But its heavy emphasis on 
continued state building, curbing the impact of economic liberalisation, and promotion of 
developmentalism, has also meant that its approach to Indonesia has a stronger political 
economy edge than that of the US. 
 
Japan, the political economy of security, and the ‘axis of evil’ 
 
Japan’s reaction to the terrorism of al-Qaeda immediately following 9/11 and to the US-led 
campaign in Afghanistan indicates that it has sought to further expand incrementally its 
military role in international security, but that its prime response has been to emphasise 
approaches to security that utilise economic power. This political economy approach to 
security has to some extent complemented that of the US by supporting key allies in the ‘war 
on terror’, but in other ways Japan has shown signs of diverging from the US path due to its 
long-term commitment to state-building and human security. Japan it can be argued has 
continued to stand upon its principles of comprehensive security policy, and has indeed 
sharpened the focus of many of its tools of economic security.  
 
However, as the US ‘war on terror’ has developed in scope and intensity, it is probable that 
Japan may find it increasingly difficult to adhere to the comprehensive security policy line, 
and that the overall balance in its security policy may begin to shift decisively towards the 
utilisation of military power. President Bush’s identification of the ‘axis of evil’ in the 2002 
State of the Union address, and the seeming translation of this into actual US security 
strategy, has posed severe dilemmas for Japan. Japanese policy-makers, whilst implacably 
opposed to terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, have been sceptical of the real state of 
Iraq’s WMD programme and of any effective link between Iraq and al-Qaeda. Just as 
importantly, they perceive few links between Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Japan is aware of 
the possible trade in ballistic missile technology between the latter two. Nevertheless, 
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Japanese policy since the late 1970s has actually been to attempt to improve ties with Iran. Its 
motivations for this policy include a strong interest in energy security and oil supplies from 
Iran, but also a conviction, similar to that of many EU states, that engagement with Iran is the 
approach most likely to moderate its security behaviour and development of WMD. Even as 
late as October 2003 and as international pressure mounted on Iran to open its nuclear 
facilities to inspections, Japan was attempting to conclude new oil concessions in Iran. 
 
North Korea, in contrast, is perceived as a clear threat to Japanese security due its previously 
clandestine and now openly declared nuclear weapons programme and development of 
ballistic missiles. But again Japan’s optimum policy approach towards North Korea since the 
mid-1990s has been one of balanced military deterrence and economic engagement. Japan 
thus looked upon the ‘axis of evil’ concept with a mixture of puzzlement and apprehension: 
puzzlement in that it could see no linkages between its component states; apprehension, in 
that it saw the US as possibly intent in not only eliminating the Iraqi regime and waging war 
in the Middle East, but also possibly moving on next to North Korea and provoking an 
unnecessary conflict in East Asia with deep implications for Japan’s own military security 
policy.  
 
Japan has consequently reacted to the war in Iraq with considerable caution. It has felt 
obliged to express strong backing for US military actions due to its shared concern over 
WMD proliferation, and because it has seen its public support for the US as a test of the 
political solidarity of alliance ties. Moreover, while Japan has felt deep discomfort at the 
US’s eventual sidelining of the UN in the launching of the Iraq war, it has adopted an 
approach which views limited cooperation with the US as the best way to curb its unilateralist 
tendencies over the longer term. All the same, though, Japan has been determined that it 
should be highly cautious about being sucked into the Iraq conflict militarily. Japan’s 
ATSML, as noted above, premises SDF despatch on UN explicit resolutions related to the 
combating of terrorism, a condition clearly not met in the case of the Iraq war. Japan in June 
2003 did pass the LCSMHRA to enable the dispatch of the JSDF for logistical and 
reconstruction efforts. However, the JSDF is still provided with a purely non-combat role, 
and the Japanese government has not yet despatched and is unlikely to despatch its troops 
until it can be proved that the security environment in Iraq has improved to the point that its 
personnel are not in danger—a scenario that may take considerable time or never even 
materialise. 
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Meanwhile, Japan has attempted to compensate for its inability to contribute militarily to the 
war in Iraq by again employing economic power. Japan’s government has been a major donor 
of humanitarian aid to Iraq, and hinted strongly at its willingness to provide ODA for 
reconstruction efforts. Japan announced a plan in May 2003 to provide economic aid for 
rebuilding the physical infrastructure of Iraq in the areas of water and energy supplies, health, 
and education. In early October 2003 Japan then pledged US$1.5 billion to support 
reconstruction. However, Japan’s ability to employ its economic power for security ends in 
Iraq has still been hindered by the lack of UN mandates supporting the US and UK 
reconstruction efforts; its need to confirm very much to a US-dominated reconstruction 
agenda that has focussed on physical infrastructure; and the seeming lack of a consistent plan 
on behalf of the occupying powers for the rebuilding of the Iraqi state.  
 
The case of Iraq is one where Japan’s comprehensive security policy and application of tools 
of economic security policy has been very much blunted by the US approach to the ‘war on 
terror’. Arguably, though, the case of North Korea, at the other end of the ‘axis of evil’, and 
as another potential target of the US ‘war on terror’ and campaign against WMD 
proliferation, is one where Japan may find that it has to radically transform the nature of its 
economic security tools or discard them altogether. As noted above, Japan’s approach 
towards North Korea since the first revelations of its suspected plutonium-route nuclear 
programme in the mid-1990s has been one of military deterrence combined with economic 
engagement. Japan’s primary military role in responding to the potential North Korean 
nuclear threat has been to further augment its support for US power projection capacity to 
deal with military contingencies on the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere in Northeast Asia. 
This has taken the form of the revised 1997 Guidelines for Japan-US Defence Cooperation, 
which make clear for the first time the range of logistical support that Japan will provide to 
its ally in a military contingency. At the same time, Japan has supported US efforts to engage 
North Korea via the Agreed Framework of 1994 and the establishment of the Korean 
Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO). KEDO has sought to provide heavy 
fuel oil and funding for the construction of two light water nuclear reactors (LWR) in North 
Korea, in return for the North’s freezing and eventual dismantlement of its nuclear 
programme. Japan’s government has pledged a total of US$1 billion for the construction of 
the LWRs. Japan additionally has supported South Korea’s ‘sunshine’ engagement policy 
towards the North, and periodically provided major quantities of food aid bilaterally and via 
multilateral agencies to North Korea. Japanese economic engagement of the North since the 
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mid-1990s has been hampered by the lack of normalised diplomatic relations between the 
two states, which precludes the full scale provision of ODA. In turn, Japan-North Korea 
normalisation talks, ongoing since the early 1990s, have been undermined by a range of 
bilateral disputes, including the fate of Japanese citizens abducted to North Korea since the 
1970s, and North Korea’s claims for compensation and apologies from Japan for its period of 
colonial rule on the Korean Peninsula. Japan has persisted with attempts to engage North 
Korea bilaterally, and to support US and South Korean engagement strategies, in the 
realisation that military conflict to resolve the nuclear problem is a highly costly option, and 
that in large part North Korea’s external military brinkmanship is driven by its internal 
economic crisis and the need to extract economic concessions from the US and its allies to 
ensure its survival (Hughes 1999). Moreover, if Japan were to finally engagement with North 
Korea, it would mean that significant Japanese economic power could be brought to bear in 
seeking to resolve the root economic causes of North Korea’s insecurity and its presence as a 
threat to regional security—Japan likely as it is to agree to provide up to US$10 billion in 
ODA and what it terms as ‘economic cooperation’ in order to settle North Korea’s claims for 
colonial compensation.  
 
Japan’s approach towards the North Korean security problem can be seen as one which 
understands the North’s military behaviour as driven by economic insecurity, and is grounded 
on the belief that the North can to some degree be contained militarily, but that ultimately its 
security behaviour can only be moderated through the application of military power. Japan’s 
approach towards North Korea, though, has been thrown very much off balance since the 
advent of the Bush administration. North Korea’s inclusion within the ‘axis of evil’ 
confirmed for many Japanese policy-makers the US’s disenchantment with engagement 
policies towards the North, and raised fears that the US might even consider military action 
against the North to halt its nuclear programme; a policy line which had previously been 
thought of as a non-option due to the likely devastation of the Korean Peninsula and the 
strong objections of China, and the US’s own allies. 
 
 Japan has been further unnerved by North Korea’s defiant stance towards the US since late 
2002. In October 2002 North Korea revealed that it possessed a previously unknown uranium 
enrichment programme providing another possible route to nuclear weapons acquisition. 
Following this, in December 2002 North Korea announced that it would restart its plutonium 
reprocessing programme, and in January 2003 its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear 
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Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). By 2003 both North Korea and the US had declared the 
1994 Agreed Framework as effectively void, so throwing the future of KEDO into doubt.  
 
Japan’s own policy response has been to attempt to use diplomatic means to nudge both sides 
back into dialogue. Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō made a landmark visit to 
North Korean in September 2002 for direct talks with Kim Jong-Il. The purpose of this 
summit was to clear away many of the obstacles to the progress of Japan-North Korea 
normalisation, to stress Japan’s concerns to the North about its nuclear programme and 
solidarity with US position on non-proliferation, and to demonstrate to the US the importance 
of dialogue with the North. Japan’s diplomacy experienced a number of successes and 
failures which cannot be explored in depth here. But whilst Japan was not wholly successful 
in de-coupling North Korea from the ‘axis of evil’ in US eyes, its diplomacy, coupled with 
that of South Korea, did at least succeed in contributing to the restart of US-North Korea 
dialogue in early 2003.  
 
Japan still, though, faces a harsh dilemma over the North Korean issue. Its optimum policy is 
one which addresses the political economy of insecurity in North Korea through dialogue and 
economic engagement. However, the restart of US-North Korea dialogue this has proved to 
be a fractious process, resulting in further North Korean threats towards the US and its allies 
involving its nuclear programme and other military capabilities. Meanwhile, Japan itself is 
unable to engage North Korea more vigorously because of its own bilateral difficulties in the 
normalisation process, its concerns about North Korea’s WMD and ballistic missile 
programmes, and its desire not to be seen to break ranks with its US ally. Japan is then faced 
with a deteriorating security situation on the Korean Peninsula and has few policy tools that it 
can activate for its stabilisation.  
 
The outcome is that Japan may be faced with serious choices about how it will react if North 
Korea refuses to desist from its nuclear programme. If the US pushes for economic sanctions 
against the North, Japan will have to convert its tools of economic engagement from carrots 
to sticks. It is envisaged that Japan will cut remittances from the large North Korean 
community resident in Japan, and cooperate in the interdiction of North Korean shipping. 
Even more significantly, if there is a repeat of the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1994, Japan 
will need to provide clear military support for the US under the revised Guidelines for 
Defence Cooperation. Japan may be forced to consider other types of military action if North 
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Korea continues to try to coerce its neighbours with its threatened nuclear programme. Japan 
is highly likely to move from the stage of cooperative research with the US into a Ballistic 
Missile Defence (BMD) to the stage of development and deployment, with all the attendant 
consequences for further accelerating North Korea’s ballistic missile programme and China’s 
nuclear modernisation. Japanese hawkish policy-makers, such as the current Director General 
of the Japan Defence Agency, Ishiba Shigeru have also begun to moot the issue of what 
approximates to preemptive strikes by Japan on North Korean missile sites—an interesting 
echo of the new US national security strategy. Hence, the end result of the US’s intention 
under the Bush administration to pressure North Korea more actively on its nuclear 
programme as part of the ‘axis of evil’ and campaign against WMD, could be for Japan to 
ultimately abandon its economic engagement approach towards the North, and to prod it into 
becoming a more assertive military actor in the region and to contravene many of its post-war 
concepts of comprehensive security.  
 
Conclusion: Japan’s unequal commitment to comprehensive security 
 
Japan since 9/11 has found itself caught in a chain of events that, in the same way, as other 
developed states and US allies, has obliged it to reconsider its stance vis-à-vis the US and its 
overall security policy. For Japan, this challenge has been particularly acute as the constraints 
upon its use of military power and high degree of military dependence on the US have meant 
that it has had to move with considerable caution in order not to alienate the US. From the 
sections above, it is clear that Japan has experienced varying degrees of ambivalence towards 
the ‘war on terror’ and the ‘axis of evil’. It has agreed with the objectives of eliminating 
terrorism and WMD, but has often doubted whether the US fully understands the underlying 
political economy causation of these threats, and whether the US’s crude application of 
military power and economic power really promises a long term solution to these problems. 
Nonetheless, Japan has felt it necessary to offer a degree of support to the US, and the ‘war 
on terror’ and ‘axis of evil’ have begun to affect important change in its security policy.  
 
Japan’s immediate response to the 9/11 attacks and the war in Afghanistan through the 
mechanism of the ATSML has established important precedents for the expansion of its 
military role. However, the reconstruction of Afghanistan has also offered opportunities for 
Japan to refine its political economy approach to security and deploy economic assistance in 
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state-building and human security projects, thus representing in many ways a continuation of 
its comprehensive security policy.  
 
The ‘axis of evil’, the Iraq war, and the new nuclear crisis brewing in North Korea, however, 
have not proved so conducive to the practice of comprehensive security policy. Japan has 
found it difficult as yet (although this may change with new UN mandates) to bring its 
economic power to bear in Iraq, and in a situation so heavily dominated by US visions of 
state reconstruction. Meanwhile, in the case of North Korea, and possibly regardless of 
Japanese attempts to prevent the US from extending its military approach to halting WMD 
proliferation to East Asia, Japan is now confronted with a looming military crisis. Japan finds 
itself unable to use economic approaches to resolving the crisis, and, when push comes to 
shove, may choose enhanced military cooperation with the US and the build-up of its own 
military capabilities in order to respond to the nuclear threat. The result will be to push 
balance in Japan’s security policy much more towards that of military power, so undermining 
its claims to comprehensiveness.  
 
The overall conclusions that must then be reached concerning the impact of the ‘war on 
terror’ and ‘axis of evil’ on Japan’s security policy is that it is indeed affecting fundamental 
changes, and that these changes may take the form of Japan’s declining emphasis on the 
political economy aspects of international security. Arguably, this is ironic, given that the 
onset of globalisation and evidence from the post-9/11 security environment indicates that 
economic inequalities more than ever account for many sources of contemporary threats. 
Moreover, if it is asked where Japan is best equipped to make a difference regionally and 
globally in a post-9/11 world, the most likely response would be through a economic 
approach to security rather than through military means. However, the US’s logic of the ‘axis 
of evil’, and Japan’s deepening alliance ties with the US, are creating the circumstances that 
may push Japan away from comprehensive approaches to security.  
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